A sociology of environmental representation.
Introduction
The image of polar bears on melting ice has become an emblematic representation of climate change; that is, it makes present 'something which is nevertheless not present' (Pitkin 1967, 8-9, italics in original) . The image has been frequently used in various forms of climate-change communication. For example, it was used in animated form both in the European Commission's climate campaign CHANGE (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) and David Guggenheim's documentary An Inconvenient Truth from 2006. The documentary is about former United States Vice President Al Gore and his engagement in the climate change issue. As these examples elucidate, there are different forms of environmental representation. Drawing on Pitkin (1967) , we can distinguish between representation as 'standing for' and representation as 'acting for'. The image of polar bears on melting ice and other images, graphs and descriptions in both the documentary and the EU campaign are representations of (stand for) global climate change and environmental degradation. With their engagement in the issue, the European Commission and Al Gore, as well as the producer of the documentary, are representatives acting for the environment, trying to convince people to engage in climate change mitigation. At the same time, a person like Al Gore can be seen as a representation of (standing for) environmental engagement.
In examining environment and society relations, representation will always be at the core, but this fact and the intricacies of representation practices are often neglected.
The environment or 'nature' cannot plead its own case but must be represented. Numerous actors claim to speak on behalf of nature while at the same time they may represent a country or region, an organization, a scientific or expert community, certain vulnerable groups, animals and/or future generations. As representatives, they use a variety of descriptive and symbolic representations standing for the environment, environmental degradation or environmental responsibility-taking.
Sustainability issues are transboundary in time and space. In dealing with environmental issues with global, long-term and often irreversible impacts, the issue of representation is fundamental to address. Previous research on environmental representation focuses on democratic deficits and practical challenges of representation, and scholars suggest what normative principles should be taken into consideration (e.g. Dobson 1996; Goodin 1996; Eckersley 1999; O'Neill 2001; Carolan 2006) . In theoretical discussions of representative democracy, scholars have recently elaborated claims-making and the construction of the constituencies as important aspects of representation (Saward 2008; Bray 2011) . These perspectives broaden the scope of representation, suggesting that representation is broader than procedural aspects of election, deliberative forums, authorization and accountability. A starting point of this paper is that there is much representation going on -both formal and informal, both reflected on and taken for granted -in various practices in the environmental field. Much of this is not sufficiently understood as representation in a broad sense, neither in scholarship nor in practice. In this paper, we revisit Pitkin's (1967) classic work on representation and elaborate both the 'standing for' and the 'acting for' aspect of environmental representation. We further distinguish between on the one hand actors (representatives) and on the other hand artefacts and tools in representation practices. By juxtaposing this theoretical strand with environmental sociology and literature from other fields (e.g. transnational democracy, sociology of science and cultural studies), we contribute to improving our understanding of representation as a multifaceted and dynamic activity, as well as the performative aspects of representation. Such an understanding is important in order to understand conditions for environmental action, communication, politics, democracy, management and governance. It is essential to understand the role, meaning and intricate facets of environmental representation, which always must include asking the critical questions of what nature and which interests are represented (or not) in various practices.
In the next section, we develop our theoretical framework. Section 3 focuses primarily on the 'acting for' dimension of representation, and we discuss both formal and informal aspects of representation and highlight the role of various representatives. Section 4 focuses primarily on the 'standing for' dimension, and we focus particularly on tools for visualizing environmental issues and for communicating to the public. Then follows our concluding section, in which we suggest how environmental sociology can be a crucial platform for intriguing new studies on environmental representation.
2. Theoretical point of departure -practices of environmental representation For any environmental action -in politics, education, management, governance, policy advice and so on -representation is a necessity. Environmental issues usually concern global, complex and abstract issues, which make them particularly dependent on scientific knowledge (Yearley 1992) . Environmental sociologists have long since demonstrated and theorized the consequences of the basic fact that most environmental risks are unfelt, unseen and consequently unknown without a significant level of abstract thinking (Beck 2009 ). To be experienced by a broader audience and to be governable, environmental problems must be translated, visualized and communicated via various representations (Leopold 1969; Lidskog 2014) .
A useful starting point for theorizing environmental representation is Hanna Pitkin's (1967) distinction between representing as 'standing for' (describing, mapping or symbolizing something) and representation as 'acting for'. The point of departure for her conceptualization is the notion of representing; that is, presenting again and making the absent present (71, 92). Representations may be based on the idea of depiction (e.g. art, blueprints or proportional models) and analogies, implying some kind of connection between the representation and the represented. However, the representation is often symbolic; the symbol or sign used to represent is arbitrary and in itself meaningless (70) (71) . In this symbolic sense, for example, a person or a flag can represent a country or an idea (e.g. freedom and/or democracy). An important aspect of symbolic representation is its ability to suggest and evoke certain feelings (98). Although Pitkin acknowledges the importance of the 'standing for' aspect of representation, she strongly emphasizes representation as activity; that is, representation as acting for others and in the interest of someone or something else. According to Pitkin's conceptualization, representation includes both acting on behalf of others (actual people who may have wishes or interests they can articulate), acting in someone's interest even if his/her wishes are not or cannot be articulated (if so, these wishes must be 'potentially there and potentially relevant') and acting to represent an abstract idea (e.g. solidarity, truth or justice) (155). For the continuing discussion in this paper, we find two aspects of Pitkin's conceptualization especially relevant: first, her analytical distinction between 'standing for' and 'acting for' and second, the broadening of the discussion concerning who or what can be represented.
Pitkin's approach has been well cited, but nonetheless criticized as too static and narrow. An observed problem is that the represented is conceptualized as existing prior to the representative and is authorizing the representative (O'Neill 2001; Rehfeld 2006; Saward 2008; Bray 2011) . Accordingly, we cannot treat the represented as an unproblematic given. From this angle, representatives and the represented are mutually constituted in practices of representation, and none of them exist independently from the cultural norms and the institutions in which representative practices take place. If a person claims to represent future generations, that representative definitely exists prior to the one represented. Scholars have emphasized a constitutive dimension of representation and see representation as performative (Saward 2008; Bray 2011) . Identities and interests are simultaneously constituted in representative practices. Representative practices must be seen as multidimensional, for example, not just focusing on formal procedures, which could be elections or deliberative forums for the inclusion of marginalized groups, but also many informal processes as well, including the reflections, roles and devices of representatives. This argumentation leads to a focus on the representative claims-making process, which includes both making claims and the judging and accepting (or rejecting) of representative claims by an audience. The audience applies 'rules of recognition' to judge whether a claimant is a representative in a particular case (Rehfeld 2006) . Such audiences can be those represented but usually consist of other actors, for instance, other parties in a 'legislature'. As soon as an audience accepts someone as a representative, representation is literally occurring. The representative himself might not even be aware of this, because someone else could have selected him as a symbolic representation (standing for) for something.
In addition to the distinction between 'acting for' and 'standing for', seen from a practice-oriented, dynamic, performative and context-sensitive perspective, we argue that it is also important to distinguish between (a) actors and (b) artefacts and tools.
Actors, we can also call representatives. First, representatives can act on behalf of various groups. These groups may be either the organizations that representatives have a formal mandate to speak for, or other groups to which they have informal ties and affiliations. Representatives can also act as self-appointed spokespersons for various groups, animals, cultural heritage or the environment. Likewise, a person can have the mandate to represent the members of an environmental organization, while the members of the organization have a selfappointed mission to represent the environment. Second, representatives may also function as symbols, for example, as role models (standing for) and good examples, which others can try to mimic or in other ways be inspired by (e.g. Mahatma Gandhi). The representative may speak of different constituencies at the same time and there can be several layers of representation, which may create certain ambivalences in representation. For example, in a multilevel governance system, a particular government may send elected political delegates who are supposed to represent both a country and a larger region while at the same time being elected to represent a 'green' party. We explore these intricacies further in Section 3.
Artefacts and tools for representing the environment can also have this double characteristic of 'acting for' and 'standing for'. As 'standing for', these devices can function as representations of particular realities. This is perhaps most evident in the role of maps and models. In environmental communication, metaphors and images are also frequently used to represent environmental degradation. Tools such as eco-labels and carbon calculators can be applied for representing environmental friendliness, engagement and responsibility-taking. Such kinds of representation constitute a crucial component in the act of representing someone or something, implying the entwinement of the two aspects (standing for and acting for) of representation. For example, at the same time as the carbon calculator symbolically represents environmental friendliness, it is a vital part in the act of 'carbon dieting' (Paterson and Stripple 2010, 352 f.) . Likewise, eco-labels, along with their symbolic function, are entwined in consumers' acts of green consumption and in eco-labellers' acts of providing solutions. It is important to emphasize that the 'acting for' function of artefacts and tools cannot just be seen in the light of instrumental rationality from a particular actor's view. For example, from the perspective of actor network theory, tools can be seen as having a relatively independent role in shaping the opportunities, including narrowing the scope, for actors to represent someone or something (which is a point that can be taken without attributing 'agency' to these tools). Green consumers, for instance, are not just rationally using ecolabels to speak and act for the environment. In these kinds of representative practices, green consumers are significantly shaped and restricted, first by the availability of these tools and, second, by the ways these tools have been constructed and framed (Boström and Klintman 2008) . Such characteristics of tools for representation will be further discussed in Section 4.
In Table 1 , we recapitulate the different facets of representation practices. The table does not present a typology of representation practices; rather, one single representation practice is likely to contain all these facets. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind the dynamic, performative and contextsensitive view on representation. Accordingly, the purpose of the table is to summarize the main ideas of the above discussion and clarify some distinctions of analytical value.
Acting for: formal and informal representation
In this section, we discuss different aspects of representation as 'acting for'. First, we focus representation and democracy, discussing the notion of missing constituencies and some suggestions of how this matter could be dealt with. Second, we turn our attention to what it means to be a representative, focusing on multiple roles, representative claims-making and potential dilemmas that a representative might experience.
Representation and democracy
In political science and political sociology, one important theme has been the problem of representative democracy in relation to environmental issues. It is a well-known and commonly discussed fact that our current systems of representative democracy are a poor match for the cross-border, global and often very long-term effects of environmental problems. Usually, only a portion of those actually affected by a particular problem have the ability to take part in or send delegates to relevant political forums. This problem of the missing 'environmental constituencies' is, for example, well described by the political scientist Andrew Dobson (1996) . Dobson points at three missing constituencies. First, representation of interests is restricted to national citizens, whereas those responsible for causing environmental risks and pollution live elsewhere. This observation is often linked to discussions about 'democratic deficit' in global politics and governance. A variety of studies show how globalization and the increase of transnational politics and governance challenge traditional understandings of the nation-state, democracy and representation (e.g. Beck 2009; Mason 2005; Boström and Garsten 2008; Lidskog, Soneryd, and Uggla 2011) . Literature, moreover, identifies the shortcomings of representation in relation to the double loyalties of representatives (Srivastava 2002) , the Western preferential right of interpretation (Hannerz 1996) , reproduced environmental injustice (Gallardo and Stein 2007; Vos, Sapat, and Thai 2002) , legitimacy challenges when specific NGOs claim to represent global civil society (Jordan and van Tuijl 2006; Mateja 2012) , and power and self-determination in relation to land use (Schmidt and Peterson 2009) .
The second missing constituency is future generations. While it is indisputable that current actions affect the life conditions of future generations, a crucial question is whether this fact entitles their interests to some form of democratic representation in the current political system. The observation that current generations are for various reasons biased towards 'presentism' and are neglecting or discounting future generations is indeed a powerful argument that something ought to be done to have non-present generations represented (Thompson 2010) . The tricky question is how.
The third missing constituency is animals, or even the natural environment as a whole. Dobson (1996) provides several arguments why these groups and entities ought to have representation and he discusses various forms of direct and indirect representation.
A challenging task is to find and select people and groups from the present generation who could work as a 'proxy electorate'. One solution, discussed by Dobson, is to identify a 'sustainability lobby' that already has its eyes firmly on foreign affected citizens (these could, of course, also be directly included), future citizens and animals, and providing them room for some kind formal representation. This lobby would then have the mandate to speak for these other groups. Numerous theoretical and practical challenges remain, obviously (see critique in Thompson 2010) . For example, how can the sustainability lobby separate claims on behalf of the other unrepresented groups and claims on behalf of already represented groups, including themselves? Should we rely on the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) or the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)? A comment to this is that the very diversity of positions within this sustainability lobby could suffice to ensure a rich debate and responsible decision-making (see Eckersley 1999) .
Scholars have developed these points based on critical but sympathetic discussion of Habermas's theory of discursive ethics. First, deliberative institutions have their own problems of representation: 'Willingness and capacity to say and to be heard are unevenly distributed across class, gender, and ethnicity ' (O'Neill 2001, 484) . O'Neill also points at the problem that quality of deliberation requires small forums, whereas quality of representativeness is associated with larger forums. Second, Habermas's theory falls short with regard to environmental issues because many groups (including animals and future generations) cannot communicate. Yet, the fact that groups do not know their interests and/or cannot communicate their interests does not imply they have no moral right to be represented. We thus ought to find an approximate form of representation, which is better than providing none at all. There has to be a 'systematic "presence" of "marginalised others", so that their interests and needs are always brought into the discursive picture' (Eckersley 1999, 45) . Such presence could be achieved by various measures including quotas, 'representative thinking' and rule of thumb-procedures such as discursively applying the precautionary principle. While undistorted communication is just an ideal, 'any consensus or compromise that may be reached is likely to carry some measure of contingent legitimacy' (33). 'Complex representation' (Saward 2008) or 'contestable forms of representation' (O'Neill 2001) might be the best we can hope for.
Michael Carolan (2006) has continued the discussion regarding the problem of representation and deliberative democracy in environmental issues. He argues that there should not be any appointed particular group speaking on behalf of nature; rather, all actors should. However, as environmental problems are abstract and increasingly global in scope, it can be important to foster concrete perceptions of environmental problems in the lived world of citizens. Carolan (353) argues that 'when individuals speak for nature, they should be able to do so as ecologically embedded participants, rather than as removed (epistemologically distant) bystanders.' He is referring to a case study on a non-profit seed-bank where visiting people could experience biodiversity using all five senses and argues that tactile experience and tactile space can lead to value reflection and thus should be a conduit for the representation of nature in deliberation.
In a discussion of environment and democracy, it is also relevant to pay attention to Bruno Latour who addresses the issue of the missing constituencies by underlining the hybrid character of nature and society. Latour (1993) introduces the 'Parliament of Things' as a way to acknowledge and involve hybrids or quasi-objects and non-humans in democracy. However, this notion still relies on spokespersons, invoking the question of the capacity of someone to speak on behalf of someone or something else (Latour 2004, 64-65) .
The selected literature above shows that political science and sociology contribute important knowledge on the possibilities and limits of principles and institutions for representation and representatives. A sociology of environmental representation, however, needs to go further in the analysis of representative claim-making processes, towards more informal and dynamic processes. From this perspective, representative claim-making is dynamic, performative and inherently partial -there is never such a thing as a perfect, undistorted, full or balanced representation. Even more, perfect representation is a misleading ideal. Maps are better on a different scale than from their original (O'Neill 2001) . A perfect map -exactly mirroring the landscape -is a useless map. Moreover, representation practices, often in a concealed and unreflected way, serve to produce and reproduce power relations. In his argument that representation and democracy is a much wider topic than representative democracy, Saward (2008) addressed the need to explore representatives further. We take his advice as an important point of departure and argue that it is important for environmental sociology and other disciplines to focus on the practices of environmental representatives, including what happens inside (inner reflections) of these practices.
Being an environmental representative: multiple roles, justifications and dilemmas
Environmental representatives are central if the interests of any kind of affected group or entity, unable to speak for themselves, are to be considered. Representatives are needed because living and not-yet-living humans, animals and natural entities possess an absent or unequal capacity to frame problems that require action. As a consequence, it is important to focus attention on the environmental representatives, as well as on their practices, including the artefacts and tools they utilize in their undertaking to represent the environment. Indeed, the roles, qualities and practices of representatives are often neglected in discourses and discussions on 'participation', 'deliberation' and 'stakeholder inclusion'. Who are they and how do they justify their positions? Who and what do the environmental representatives claim to represent? A sociological understanding of environmental representatives must acknowledge the often multiple layers of affiliations, formal and informal, they are likely to identify with. Environmental representatives may be of different kinds: leaders in environmental movement organizations, environmental/sustainability managers in companies, officials in environmental protection agencies, politicians in green political parties or environmental spokespersons in 'red' and 'blue' political parties, environmental journalists, environmental teachers, environmental scientists (some engaging in policy advice and counselling), sustainability consultants, green activists and green consumers. In an open society, any citizen can assert herself as representative of certain groups (Saward 2008) . Some of these types of representatives are embedded in formal organizational accountabilities -they act not just on behalf of the 'environment' but also on behalf of an organization. We can expect that the issue of representation is rarely, if ever, clear-cut for any of these types of actors. For example, while an environmental manager is expected to be loyal to the organization s/he is employed at, s/he may at the same time be part of a professional network, which may be important for her/his identity, expertise, priorities and hence representative practices, and s/he may also be engaged as member in an environmental movement organization. Organizational affiliation provides a context for identification and accountability, yet it reduces the degrees of freedom for multiple representations. Temptations and motivations to include other sources of identifications and affiliations -such as sympathies for affected publics in developing countries, animals or future generations -into one's action may be something the organization will try to reduce and control. Environmental scientists, journalists and activists may have a larger scope to speak on behalf of other groups and entities -because it is part of their mandate to do so -than environmental ministers, officials and managers because the latter are locked by their organizational belonging and face more institutionalized and more formal styles of representative practices.
How are representatives authorized? How can they justify their positions as representatives as well as justifying their representative claims? Simply being affiliated with a group does not entail that one is a representative of that group (O'Neill 2001, 493) . Representatives may combine various principles when they implicitly or explicitly defend their own positions and claims. They can rely on formal authorization, ownership, previous achievements, shared identities (e.g. gender, ethnic and religious), specific experience, knowledge and expertise when justifying themselves and their claims (cf. Rehfeld 2006; Bray 2011) .
Specific knowledge and expertise are particularly important for justification in environmental representation. The fact that the lay-expert divide is a commonly discussed topic in environmental sociology relates to this. Indeed, it is through science, or epistemic claims combined with care (O'Neill 2001), that a spokesperson for the environment can claim how, for instance, the life chances of future generations will be affected. Science is a necessary (but insufficient and sometimes unreliable) component in this representative claim (Yearley 1992) .
Justifications of representativeness may be assumed and taken for granted rather than claimed and debated. Various actors nominate themselves as spokespersons or 'ombudsmen' for nature (see e.g. Hillmo and Lohm 1997 ). An act of power in representative practices can even be to disguise that there is a representative practice going on. For example, a scientist can develop a claim referring to universal and objective facts. A business person may disguise his own stake in an issue by referring to ownership, Environmental Sociologyimpersonal market forces and economic rationality. Experts may justify their representation because they are 'experts' while rejecting other stakeholders' representativeness exactly because they represent 'particular' groups. NGOs are quite often targeted as being unaccountable and mere self-appointed representatives, often by other actors (such as companies) who fail to see their own particular stake in the issue (Jordan and van Tuijl 2006) .
Representatives can also be granted representativeness by an 'audience' (Rehfeld 2006) , by a whole range of means, for example by voting, appointment, deliberation, random selection or custom. The first examples in the list involve a selection that is somehow reflected upon. We argue it is also important to highlight the possibility that a representative is selected by custom, which in turn can reproduce position of power. Once selected as a representative, a representation practice can be routinized, institutionalized and subsequently taken for granted. After a while, the representative continues as a representative without reflecting much on it. The risk is that the representative loses touch with the constituencies s/ he is supposed to represent.
Representative practices can be further understood by paying attention to the concept of dilemma (Billig et al. 1988; Höijer, Lidskog, and Uggla 2006) . In everyday language, the concept of dilemma means that a person faces a situation with two options, each with some desired or undesired results. Dilemma is often understood as a situation of difficult choice -either because the available alternatives have undesirable consequences, or because the person feels the pressure of incompatible demands.
However, people do not necessarily need to be involved in a problematic choice situation in order to face dilemmas and experience ambivalence (Höijer, Lidskog, and Uggla 2006) . With the concept of the ideological dilemma, Billig et al. (1988) point out that ideology involves contrary values, that is, principles that are cherished and understood in relation to conflicting values. For example, in the case of transnational (environmental) representation, there is a tension between universal rights and local rights of self-determination and recognition. Also, the relation between welloff (often self-proclaimed) representatives from developed countries and affected people in developing countries reveals a fundamental dilemma. The representatives could be seen as 'global' individuals spending many days travelling every year, developing relationships among people like themselves (Hannerz 1996) . Socially, the representatives have particular organizational affiliations and often belong to the rich and highly mobile category of the world's population, while speaking on behalf of future generations or poor marginalized people that are entangled in the local (cf. Bauman 1998).
Standing for: representation in environmental communication
In this section, we discuss different aspects of representation as 'standing for'. We turn our attention to the different means of communicating environmental issues in representation practices. Drawing on studies of news media, environmental campaigns and eco-labelling, we first discuss visualization of environmental issues through symbolic representations such as images, numbers and metaphors. Thereafter, we elaborate on the role of artefacts and tools in environmental communication and governance.
Visualization of environmental issues
Contemporary society has been described as dominated by visual culture (Liebsch 2007) . Sometimes new visualizing technologies lead scholars to talk about a visual turn. From a historical perspective, however, the visual has doubtless long been important and integral to human cultures. Likewise, it seems futile to distinguish between 'visual' and other media, as most media are mixed or hybrid (Mitchell 2002, 174) . In scientific communication and popular versions of scientific data, visual means are frequently used. In his examination of inscriptions, Latour (1986, 14) states 'We are so used to this world of print and images, that we can hardly think what it is to know something without indexes, bibliographies, dictionaries, papers with references, tables, columns, photographs, peaks, spots, bands.' Some of these devices are important to show the argument and thereby convince the audience. In environmental communication, such as information campaigns, images and other visual means (e.g. logotypes, numbers, and the green colour) are often used to convince, move and engage the viewer. To be sure, images are not the only means to represent ideas or entities; verbal communication and written text are important methods of representation, and tactile experience from all five senses can be used to reach a level of epistemic intimacy (Carolan 2006) . However, the frequent use of images as representations of environmental issues warrants a closer review. An important aspect of symbolic representation is its ability to suggest and evoke feelings (Pitkin 1967) . Images are a popular and effective means to communicate and concretize abstract issues and to emotionally engage the viewer (Mitchell 2002; Joffe 2008; Mortimer 2008; Smith and Joffe 2009) . A special feature of visual material is that it is often immediate in impact, memorable and salient. Compared with written text, images have a certain 'ability to arouse emotion' (Joffe 2008, 84) .
In his ethics, Emmanuel Lévinas (1969) stresses that the meeting with 'the Other' face-to-face -or the recognition of the Other -constitutes the foundation for an ethical response to and responsibility for the Other. The gaze of the Other establishes symbolic contact, and 'asks something of you in an imaginary relationship' (Machin 2007, 111; see also; Mitchell 2002, 175f.) . In an in-depth analysis, David Redmalm (2011) demonstrates that Lévinas' ethics is applicable to the non-human world as well, implying that recognizing a particular animal as the Other raises awareness and moral obligations. The study also illustrates how images of individual animals have been used by the animal rights movement to foster awareness of and engagement in animals' conditions. Similarly, the WWF sponsorship programme encourages people to adopt an animal to help safeguard the future of certain species and conserve the natural world, using images of individual animals that are sometimes even given personal names, and a study of biodiversity representation in news media illustrates how featuring endangered species gives biodiversity a 'face' (Seppänen and Väliverronen 2003) .
Both news media and environmental campaigns frequently use images to represent the environment and environmental degradation. For example, images have been used to emphasize the fragility of the Earth and the severity of environmental threats (Doyle 2007; Uggla 2008) . Since the first picture of the Earth from outer space was captured in 1968, the image of the globe has become an icon for its 'unlimited finitude' and the common fate of humanity (Szerszynski and Urry 2006) . In the European Commissions' climate campaign, the photo of the Earth with a thermostat dial attached is the first image that greets visitors on the website, and it was used on giant posters in the first drive of the campaign. The idea behind this metaphor was to establish a relationship between people's everyday activities and global climate change (Uggla and Uggla 2016) . A way to represent the risk of global climate change as 'real', for example as employed by Greenpeace, is to use photos of glacial retreat as a visible sign (Doyle 2007) . Melting ice was also a common theme in British press (Smith and Joffe 2009) and in a study of media reception participants in focus groups spontaneously recalled imagery of suffering polar bears and flooding as evidence of ongoing climate change (Olausson 2011) .
Images used in environmental communication and governance are not simply illustrations and cannot be reduced to the meanings carried by things in their surroundings (cf. Rose 2007, 11) . Rather, images are to be seen as representations -concretizing abstract or elusive entities such as 'nature', the environment and/or environmental degradation by featuring iconic animals, heroes or melting glaciers. In both news media and environmental campaigns, both textual metaphors and photographic and other images tend to turn complex issues into 'easily digestible slogans' (Seppänen and Väliverronen 2003, 81; see also; Soneryd and Uggla 2015) . Many media studies are inspired by Stuart Hall (1997) , who emphasizes the visual in culture by drawing out ideological aspects realized in images. For example, nature imagery may contribute to a romantic gaze, an understanding of nature as pristine and untrodden land and an understanding of nature as resource (Hansen and Machin 2013: 153) . Nature can be framed in various ways and these frames may intersect in one and the same context (Uggla and Olausson 2013) . Representations, thus, are not neutral but come imbued with assumptions and values (Carolan 2009, 279; Hall 1997) . The meaning of a sign is not fixed but is a potential that can be realized under certain circumstances (Machin 2007, 3-4) . The interpretation of visual representations, then, is a result of culture, but this does not mean that we can take the audience's perceptions for granted or expect complete consistency in visual communication in a certain context.
Providing tools for engagement
Another feature of environmental communication, especially in environmental campaigns, concerns engagement and involvement in eco-friendly lifestyles and 'climate smart' behaviour. Information campaigns have been a common device to engage people by focusing on simple changes in everyday life, providing various tools for the realization of an eco-friendly lifestyle. These campaigns can be seen as representations framing what it means to be an environmentally responsible citizen. Framing concerns how certain information or aspects of an issue are made salient, which includes overlooking or downplaying other aspects (Entman, 1993) . In studies of politics and social movements, framing analysis has been used to identify how certain issues are constructed in the pursuit of a particular policy direction, stressing issue framing as an important political resource (e.g. Benford and Snow 2000; Jacoby 2000) . In environmental campaigns, we find tools for auditing such as carbon calculators, checklists guiding conduct (e.g. advice on how to save energy by making small changes in everyday life) and forms inviting people to make a pledge to lead a low carbon life (Paterson and Stripple 2010; Soneryd and Uggla 2015) . These tools can be seen as representations of what it means to be an environmentally responsible citizen, at the same time as they are entwined in practices, focusing environmentally friendly behaviour based on small changes in everyday practices and thereby confining our environmental imagination. For example, the construction of 'normal' environmental engagement in a narrow way may result in the loss of 'important opportunities for citizen-led actions' and the changes necessary for climate change mitigation (Kent 2009, 134, 138) . Other tools that represent environmental friendliness are product information and eco-labels. In parallel to the many images in environmental communication, as discussed above, there is abundant visualization and representation by numbers. The environmental message is partly a quantitative message with lower and higher numbers, thresholds and a variety of measures. Our environmental impact is represented by the metaphors of ecological footprints and the number of earths that would be required if our individual lifestyles were the average. We get increasingly acquainted with tools such as electricity meters, carbon emission equivalents and the like. While images can create concreteness and attachment, visualization by numbers can create an impression of objectivity, hard facts and precision. Impression of precision in, for example, carbon declarations, can however be deceptive. McKinnon (2009) provides an illustrative example of this kind of deceptive precision by describing how two similar products of potato chips were labelled with 75 g and 74 g CO 2 emissions, respectively. McKinnon (46) argues that 'given the complexity of the calculation, variability of the conditions and amount of subjective judgement that must be exercised, estimates can simply not be this exact.' According to McKinnon, the product-level carbon auditing and labelling can function as a 'wasteful distraction' given the severity of the environmental crisis facing the planet. He suggests that a traffic light system would be more honest as an informational device to the consumers, as such as system does not rely on inaccurate exactness. The colours of green, yellow and red can be powerful communication tools and are often used for representing preferred or non-preferred environmental action. The green colour is, however, a one-sided and categorical representation of environmental action, whereas solutions are seldom so simple. Eco-labels are often green and they face this dilemma.
Both consumers and producers use eco-labels as ways to represent their environmental consciousness and identities. In their study of varies eco-labelling schemes, Boström and Klintman (2008) show that eco-labelling schemes always reflect compromises made among a variety of interests. Eco-labelling can be seen as a translation process, where a complex social and environmental reality is translated to a simple, categorical message: 'this is a good environmental choice', represented by a symbol. In this process, eco-labellers function as knowledge brokers that identify, select, redistribute, translate and transform knowledge (Meyer 2010 ; see also Latour 1997; on mediators). Throughout this translation, the labelling process is, however, a balancing act between science and politics, between nature and culture, and between different sustainability aspects. These compromises are rarely communicated to the consumers. What and which environment the label represents is therefore a topic rarely discussed (Boström and Klintman 2008) .
The lesson in terms of representation is that it is crucial to ask what kind of nature and environmental engagement tools such as campaign arrangements, carbon calculators, product information and eco-labels represent (and do not represent), what kind of interests lie behind the framings of these tools, as well as what kind of representative practices such tools can activate among various users.
5. Conclusion: a sociology of environmental representation Environmental representation is a concept that allows us to ask crucial questions regarding societal actors' relation to nature. On the most general level, representation always occurs in environmental matters because nature is unable to speak for itself. Questions around representativeness and representative claim-making can also be a more explicit topic when actors engage in and debate an issue. By summarizing different facets of a representation practice in Table 1 (acting vs. standing and actors vs. artefacts and tools), we wish to contribute a model that could serve as starting point for a variety of sociological studies of environmental representation, studies that are not narrowed to questions of representative democracy. Such a sociology of environmental representation must recognize that any full, undistorted, perfect or balanced representation is impossible, as well as ground critique towards practices that include such claims. The impossibility of perfect representation is implicated already in Pitkin's theory, but this feature is particularly salient in environmental issues that involve many affected publics around the globe, as well as future generations, animals and other non-human entities. There is in any concrete case an issue of how a particular policy process, institutional framework or environmental campaign relates to all imaginable groups that may have a legitimate stake in the focused topic. Our theoretical review showed that representative claim-making is always dynamic, performative and inherently partial. Sociology can offer powerful analytical and methodological tools to capture this fluid nature of representation. We argue that environmental sociology can be a powerful stream of research to seize both formal and informal processes of representative claim-making and focus attention on the multiple identities, accountabilities and devices (artefacts and tools) appearing in representation practices. Environmental sociology is also well equipped to focus on the dilemmas involved in representation practices, including how representatives justify, debate and reflect (or not) on these dilemmas. Furthermore, environmental sociology can be a platform for critical analysis and focus attention on how representative claim-making produces and reproduces power relations. Representation is sometimes transparent and debated -perhaps more so in already institutionalized governance settings -and other times implicit and non-transparent. It is important to elucidate representation that is taken for granted, for example when experts are seen as self-evident representatives for all or when eco-labelled products are treated as environmentally friendly per se.
In previous research, there is surprisingly little attention paid to the roles, practices and reflections among environmental representatives. Future studies could focus on how the representation practices of environmental representatives (managers, activists, officials, journalists, teachers, policy advisors, consumers, etc.) are shaped, constrained or empowered by their varying organizational affiliations and professional networks. How do they reflect, if they do, on their roles, practices and tools of representation? What dilemmas do they face, if any, and how do they handle them? How do they deal with multiple accountabilities in representation practices? Exploring such questions ought to be an empirical and theoretical task for environmental sociology.
Another important avenue for future studies of environmental sociology is to focus on how and with what consequences nature, environmental degradation and environmental responsibility are represented in various types of communication (e.g. environmental campaigns, political debates, education and news media). In environmental communication, it is never possible to give a full and balanced representation of such indefinite entities as nature and the environment and of such complex phenomena as environmental degradation, engagement and responsibility. Nature and the environment are constructed and framed in sociocultural processes from which they cannot be separated. Different representations of nature and the environment entail different understandings of potential threats against these entities. Thereby some aspects are made salient while others are downplayed or ignored. Common representation of eco-friendliness highlights some aspects (e.g. the individual as a conscious and responsible consumer and energy saver) while downplaying others (e.g. the notions of politics and activism).
In this field, sociology can make important contributions by analysing aspects such as interests, power, resources, hierarchies and categorization. What kind of descriptions, metaphors, images and tools are used as representations of environmental issues and how do they help, shape and restrict audiences in their actions and representation practices? What is at stake and who has the resources to shape representative practices? How do audiences make sense of messages? Here, sociological research can make valuable contributions, for example, by empirical studies of power dimensions in communication, and perception studies of how people understand various types of environmental communication and employ devices in their own representation practices.
Despite our insistence that there can never be any complete, impartial and neutral representation, it would at the same time be dubious to say that all representations are equally useful, relevant, effective and democratic. Representations may be falsely presented as optimal, obvious, objective and neutral. Likewise, endorsement of participatory democracy and deliberation can conceal the fact that representation is going on (or that only some is included). Representation practices may have different degrees of inclusiveness, transparency and self-reflexivity. Representation practices may recognize and empower actors not-yet-represented or they may make well-represented actors more powerful and present them as 'natural' leaders. Dilemmas and ambivalences may be obscured or openly debated. Artefacts and tools may be applied in representative practices in a non-reflected or in a reflexive way.
